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Abstract
In the second half of 20th century the central theme of foreign investment debates was on ba-
lancing conflicting interests between developed and developing countries. As one of the most 
visible signs of this tendency is the process of revising bilateral investment treaties (BITs). This 
paper has focus on two countries, India and Indonesia. These two countries have been selected 
not only because of their size and importance for foreign investors, but also because of impor-
tant reforms regarding BITs undertaken by these two countries that have attracted worldwide 
attention, particularly in other developing countries. These two countries have taken different 
routes, but motivated by similar concerns and objectives, and represent some of the most striking 
examples of the new tendency towards revision of BITs. The key issue that will be explored in 
this text is: What can be expected from this process of revising BITs and do the new BITs model 
provide for a good balance between the interests of host states and foreign investors? This is the 
core issue of foreign investment law, from the perspective of developing countries, which raises 
several further questions:  How to design foreign investment law so that foreign investment can 
be attracted without impairing the interests of the host states? Is that possible at all, and what 
would be the good balance that developing countries should aim at? And, the central issue of this 
paper is: Do new BITs models contribute to these objectives of developing countries?
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I. INTRODUCTION
In the second half of 20th century the central theme of foreign invest-
ment debates was on balancing conflicting interests between developed and 
developing countries. After the differences in protection of foreign investment 
diminished with greater protection granted by the developing countries, the 
foreign investment debates have shifted into a different direction. One of the 
topics that attracted attention relates to conflicting interests of host states and 
foreign investors. This is a private-public debate, though still having elements 
of developed-developing nations divide, since private investors typically come 
from developed nations, while host countries are often developing nations. 
As one of the most visible signs of this tendency is the process of revising 
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bilateral investment treaties (BITs). According to the UNCTAD World Invest-
ment Report (2019), the number of terminations of international investment 
agreements terminated by the States continues to rise. By the end of 2018, 
the total number of effective terminations reached 309 (61% having occurred 
since 2010).1
In principle, BIT should be able to benefit both parties, based on the prin-
ciple of reciprocity, equality and non-intervention in international law. How-
ever, in practice BITs have often favored the investors at expense of the host 
states which led to dissatisfaction and complaints in many developing coun-
tries. BITs often provided for disproportionate protection of investors and 
deprived the host states of some of the fundamental rights, such as protec-
tion of health, environment and national treasures. In a number of lawsuits, 
large amounts of compensation for damages were imposed against developing 
countries. As result, a number of developing countries has undertaken a com-
prehensive revision of BITs aimed at changing the balance of these treaties in 
favor of the host states. 
This paper has focus on two countries, India and Indonesia. These two 
countries have been selected not only because of their size and importance 
for foreign investors, but also because of important reforms regarding BITs 
undertaken by these two countries that have attracted worldwide attention, 
particularly in other developing countries. These two countries have taken dif-
ferent routes, but motivated by similar concerns and objectives, and represent 
some of the most striking examples of the new tendency towards revision of 
BITs. 
The key issue that will be explored in this text is: What can be expected 
from this process of revising BITs and do the new BITs model provide for a 
good balance between the interests of host states and foreign investors? This 
is the core issue of foreign investment law, from the perspective of develop-
ing countries, which raises several further questions:  How to design foreign 
investment law so that foreign investment can be attracted without impairing 
the interests of the host states? Is that possible at all, and what would be the 
good balance that developing countries should aim at? And, the central issue 
of this paper is: Do new BITs models contribute to these objectives of devel-
oping countries?
After introducing the background of changes in India and Indonesia, the 
paper will discuss some of the key provisions of the respective BIT models, 
such as definition of investment, most favoured nation (MFN), fair and equi-
1  UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2019 (New York and Geneva: UNCTAD, 2019), available at https://
unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/wir2019_en.pdf, accessed June 9, 2020, 100.  
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table treatment (FET); investor state dispute settlement (ISDS). The objective 
is not to provide a comprehensive and detailed analyses of these new BIT 
models, but the scope is limited to these several clauses that should serve as il-
lustration of the new BIT trends. For each part, the paper discusses the current 
formulation for these provisions in the BIT models to examine how these two 
countries have addressed these issues and whether there are some similarities 
and differences in their approaches. 
II. BACKLASH AGAINST BITS AND THE REVISION 
MOVEMENT
There are many controversies and debates whether BITs have been meet-
ing their objectives, and to what extent they actually contribute to attracting 
foreign investment.  BITs have not been generally entered between developed 
countries, since their established legal systems protect private initiative and do 
not discriminate against foreign investors. Typical examples of BITs are be-
tween developed and developing countries. Developing states may have vari-
ous reasons to limit their exposure to BIT claims and should be cautious when 
negotiating BITs. However, a number of developing countries have failed to 
realize how risky BITs can be and entered into the texts as proposed by the 
developed countries.2
While almost all states are engaged in the international investment pro-
tection structure through their BITs, an increasing number of states are not 
satisfied with the current regime. In the last several years there has been a 
movement to revise and even terminate BITs in many parts of the world, due 
to a number of arbitration awards by the arbitration tribunals against the host 
states; in a number of cases arbitration tribunals treated sovereign regulatory 
measures of host states as breaches of BITs. Some of these awards imposed 
on the host states large amounts of damages.3 One of the reasons for success-
ful claims against host states has been the vague and broad language of BITs, 
such as a broad interpretation of FET standard in combination with the con-
cept of legitimate expectation. 
BITs have been criticized for their alleged failure to allow countries to ad-
dress their public policy concerns. A number of countries have made efforts to 
2  Poulsen uses the term ‘bounded rationality’ to explain the careless attitude of the governments of many 
developing countries that decided to sign BITs without proper assessment of the consequences they bear 
due to “the inflated expectations about the treaties’ economic benefits and the failure to appreciate their 
risks”. See, Lauge Poulsen, Bounded Rationality and Economic Diplomacy: The Politics of Investment 
Treaties in Developing Countries (Cambridge University Press, 2015).
3  Yukos Universal   Limited (Isle of Man) v. The Russian Federation, PCA Case No. AA 227, (July 18, 
2014). In this case the arbitration tribunal awarded the claimant more than $ 1,8 billion as damages.
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address these concerns by revising their BITs or renegotiating with their coun-
terparts. As a result, there is a tendency towards drafting a new generation of 
BITs negotiated during the past several years. New treaties attempt to preserve 
sufficient policy power and regulatory flexibility for host states to pursue pub-
lic welfare. New generation of BITs provides expressly for such authority of 
the host states, which substantially reduces the risk of claims asserting indi-
rect expropriation. This is a part of the trend that switches the basis of claims 
against host states from sole effects doctrine towards police power doctrine.
A number of related issues have been given new contents, such as the is-
sues related to protection of health and environment. Particular attention was 
given to the ISDS, in attempt to reduce the impact of BITs on sovereignty 
of the host states. There are various approaches that include termination of 
BITs, making decision not to enter into BITs in future,4  abandoning the ISDS 
mechanism,5 revision of BITs to incorporate public policy concerns, renego-
tiation, entering into new treaties without arbitration clauses; etc.6
The paper will introduce reforms of BITs undertaken by India and Indone-
sia, as two prominent examples of the new tendencies in this area. In line with 
the objective of this research, the scope will be limited to several provisions of 
the BITs drafted by these two countries that can serve to illustrate these new 
tendencies.  
III. INDIA 
A. BACKLASH AGAINST BITS
India has been active participant in the BIT program since 1990s. In 1993 
India developed its own BIT template that followed the OECD policy favour-
ing protection of foreign investment.  In 2003 India adopted its BIT model 
which was very similar to the contents of the India-UK BIT. Between 1994 to 
2011, India had signed more than 80 BITs, and in that period there were no se-
rious problems arising from those BITs. The situation has changed afterwards.
India launched a review of its investment treaties in mid-2012 in the wake 
of public outcry over arbitration claims made by a number of foreign inves-
tors. India’s backlash against BITs was initiated particularly after the White 
Industries v Republic of India case in 2011.7  In this case an ISDS tribunal 
4  For example, South Africa.
5  Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela have denounced the ICSID convention.
6  Prabhash Ranjan, Harsha Vardhana Singh, Kevin James, Ramandeep, “India’s Model Bilateral Invest-
ment Treaty: Is India Too Risk Averse?”  Brookings India IMPACT Series No. 082018, August 2018.
7  White Industries Australia Limited v. Republic of India, UNCITRAL, Final Award (Nov. 30, 2011)
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held that India violated its obligations under the India-Australia BIT. This case 
arose when White Industries filed a case against India under the India-Austra-
lia BIT due to judicial delays in enforcing an arbitration award against Coal 
India Limited in India.  White Industries argued that India had failed to pro-
vide “effective means of asserting claims and enforcing rights” to White In-
dustries. The tribunal held India responsible for violating the effective means 
standard.  After finding India not responsible for denial of justice, by invoking 
MFN standard, the tribunal imported the standard of “effective means” from 
the India–Kuwait BIT, which did not exist in the India–Australia BIT. The 
White Industries case represented a kind of wake-up-call for the Indian policy 
makers.8 
In fact, this case was not the only one that raised concerns in India. Ac-
cording to UNCTAD, a total of 24 ISDS claims have been brought against 
India so far.9
These ISDS cases against India led to a fundamental rethink and review of 
BITs. As a consequence, India has terminated 61 of out of its 84 BITs and put 
all further BIT negotiations on hold. 10 India has served notices to 58 countries 
with whom existing BITs have expired expressing willingness to renegotiate 
a new BIT with these countries based on its Model. In another move, India 
has asked for joint interpretive statements (JIS) to clarify ambiguities in treaty 
texts, in order to avoid expansive interpretations by arbitration tribunals.11
B. ADOPTION OF THE NEW BIT MODEL
As a result of efforts to improve its position in BITs, India adopted a Model 
BIT in 201612 to provide “appropriate protection to foreign investors in India” 
“while maintaining a balance between investor’s rights and the government’s 
obligations”. 13 The fact that model BIT acts as a template for the future BIT 
negotiations indicates that India intends to use the 2016 Model BIT as the 
basis to renegotiate its existing BITs and negotiate new BITs.14
8  Prabhash Rajan, “India and Bilateral Investment Treaties—A Changing Landscape ,” ICSID Review - 
Foreign Investment Law Journal 29, No. 2 (2014), 23.
9  UNCTAD, “Investor – State Dispute Settlement: Review of Developments in 2017,” IIA Issues Note, iss. 
2 (June, 2018), https://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/diaepcbinf2018d2_en.pdf, accessed June 9, 2020.
10 UNCTAD, “International Investment Agreements”, UNCTAD, https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/inter-
national-investment-agreements/countries/96/india, last assessed on June 9, 2020. 
11  Ranjan, Singh, James, Ramandeep, “India’s Model Bilateral Investment Treaty,” 10. 
12  The government of India adopted the final text of Model BIT on January 14, 2016 after consultative 
process and issuance of the draft model BIT to public in March 2015.
13  India Department of Economic Affairs, “Model Text for the Indian Bilateral Investment Treaty 2016,” 
India DEA, accessed June 9, 2020, http://www.dea.gov.in/sites/default/files/ModelBIT_Annex_0.pdf.
14  Rajan “Investment Protection and Host State’s Right to Regulate in the Indian Model Bilateral Invest-
ment Treaty Lessons for Asian Countries,” in Asia’s Changing International Investment Regime Julien 
Chaisse et al., eds. (Singapore: Springer, 2017), 48.  
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India’s new Model BIT is a major departure from its earlier framework as 
it incorporates significant changes in its attempt to safeguard the interests of 
the host state. As it will be shown, many provisions in the Model BIT can be 
seen as a response to the claims made against India.
Several provisions of the BIT Model can serve as illustration of Indian 
efforts to improve its position in BITS: the Model BIT contains a narrow defi-
nition of investment, an extremely narrow FET-type provision, MFN clause is 
omitted, while the ISDS is subjected to a major revision.
 C. DEFINITION OF INVESTMENT
The definition of investment in the Model BIT has moved away from a 
broad asset-based definition of investment to an enterprise-based definition 
where an enterprise is taken together with its assets. Art 1.4 of the Indian 
Model BIT provides: 
“‘Investment’ means an enterprise constituted, organised and operated in 
good faith by an investor in accordance with the law of the party in whose 
territory the investment is made, taken together with the assets of the en-
terprise, has the characteristics of an investment such as the commitment 
of capital or other resources, certain duration, the expectation of gain or 
profit, the assumption of risk and a significance for the development of the 
party in whose territory the investment is made. An enterprise may possess 
the following assets: (a) shares, stocks and other forms of equity instru-
ments of the enterprise or in another enterprise; (b) a debt instrument or 
security of another enterprise; (c) a loan to another enterprise  (i) where 
the enterprise is an affiliate of the investor, or  (ii) where the original ma-
turity of the loan is at least three years.”
According to Article 1.4, “investment means an enterprise that has been 
constituted, organised, and operated in good faith by an investor in accordance 
with the domestic laws of the country.”  Article 1.4 also provides a non-ex-
haustive list of assets that an enterprise may possess. It further provides that 
the enterprise must satisfy certain characteristics of investment such as com-
mitment of capital and other resources, certain duration, the expectation of 
gain or profit, and the assumption of risk and significance for the development 
of the country where the investment is made.” This provision is in line with 
criteria developed by the Salini test.15
The Model BIT specifies the meaning of the juridical person imposing as 
requirement that only an enterprise that is legally constituted in India can bring 
15 Salini Costruttori S.p.A. and Italstrade S.p.A. v. Kingdom of Morocco, ICSID Case No. ARB/00/4. 
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a BIT claim.16  Such company should have substantial business operations in 
the member state. Indian Model fails to contain an express “denial of benefits” 
clause by which the host state can deny the benefits of the treaty, including 
ISDS, in order to avoid treaty shopping by “mailbox companies”. However, 
the references to “substantial business activities in the territory of that Party” 
and  that company is “directly owned of controlled by a natural person of that 
Party” (which make part of definition of investor) are  sufficiently clear to ex-
clude “mailbox companies”, unless they are owned or controlled by a national 
of an investor State.17
The portfolio investment is expressly excluded from the definition.18 The 
same applies to debt securities, loans issued by a government or given to the 
government or government-owned or controlled enterprise, pre-operational 
expenditures, claims arising from commercial contracts, intangible rights 
such as goodwill, brand value, order or judgment sought or entered in any 
judicial or administrative or arbitral proceedings in the form of exclusionary 
provisions, etc.19 This just adds to the impression that the definition of invest-
ment is aimed at reducing the risk of claims by foreign investors by narrowing 
the scope of investments protected under the BIT.
D. MFN CLAUSE
India’s model BIT omits the MFN clause. This can be seen as a response 
to the White Industries case (and other pending claims). In that case, White 
Industries Australia Limited invoked the MFN clause from the India-Australia 
BIT to benefit from the more favourable rights of investors provided for in the 
India-Kuwait BIT, so that it was able invoke the right to be provided an ef-
fective means of asserting claims and enforcing rights. This case revealed the 
risks deriving from the MFN clause for the host states. 
The exclusion of MFN is aimed to prevent such cases of “treaty shop-
ping”, whereby foreign investors take advantage of provisions in other BITs 
by “borrowing” them through the MFN clause. The absence of an MFN provi-
16 Art. 1.3 provides: enterprise means: (i) any legal entity constituted, organized and operated in compliance 
with the law of a party, including  any company, corporation, limited liability partnership or a joint venture; 
and (ii) a branch of any such entity established in the territory   of a party in accordance with its law and 
carrying out business activities there
17 Art. 1.5 provides: “investor” means a natural or juridical person of a Party, other than a branch or rep-
resentative office, that has made an investment in the territory of the other Party; For the purposes of this 
definition, a “juridical person” means: (a) a legal entity that is constituted, organised and operated under 
the law of that Party and that has substantial business activities in the territory of that Party; or (b) a 
legal entity that is constituted, organised and operated under the laws of that Party and that is directly or 
indirectly owned or controlled by a natural person of that Party or by a legal entity mentioned under 
subclause (a) herein.
18 Art.1.4(i).
19 Art, 1.4 (ii)-(viii).
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sion switches the balance towards host state’s interests.  
E. FAIR AND EQUITABLE TREATMENT
In line with the concerns regarding the FET standard, the new Model BIT 
has substantially reduced the scope of the FET clause. The Model BIT does 
not completely exclude the FET standard.  Article 3(1) imposes the obligation 
on the parties to refrain from “denial of justice in any judicial or administra-
tive proceedings; or breach of fundamental due process.” The denial of justice 
represents a part of the FET standard, so that it is not completely excluded 
by the Indian Model BIT; its scope is just narrowed down. The Model BIT 
also prohibits “manifestly abusive treatment, such as coercion, duress and 
harassment.”20
 One possible reason for this limitation of FET is that India intended to 
avoid the risk of the concept of legitimate expectations, which many tribunals 
have held to be a part of the FET provision. Exclusion of the legitimate ex-
pectations means that the foreign investor shall have no remedy even when 
India creates reasonable and justifiable expectations through its conduct or by 
giving assurances (which an investor then relies upon to invest), even when 
India fails to comply with those assurances.    
After foreign investors sued India under different BITs, India realised that 
broad and vague investment protection standards can be interpreted in man-
ners that give precedence to investment protection over the host state’s right 
to regulate. Exclusion of the FET provision narrows down the scope of protec-
tion available to foreign investors. India clearly intended by this approach to 
avoid the risk that measures adopted for public policy concerns are challenged 
by foreign investors as violation of BIT’s FET provision. 
F. SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES 
The Indian Model BIT retains the ISDS mechanism to settle disputes with 
foreign investors, but it adds a number of conditions that an investor needs to 
meet before accessing ISDS.
The new Model BIT qualifies the consent to ISDS by requiring that a 
foreign investor should first exhaust local remedies at least for a period of 
five years before commencing international arbitration.21 The five years under 
the Model BIT are to be counted from the date when the foreign investor first 
acquired “knowledge of the measure in question and the resulting loss or dam-
age to the investment” or when the investor should have first acquired such 
20 Art. 3.1(iv).
21 Article 15.1 and 15.2.
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knowledge.22 
The other critical element related to exhaustion of local remedies is that 
the foreign investor should submit the dispute to the local court within one 
year from the date on which the investor acquired the knowledge or should 
have acquired the knowledge about the measure.23 
The requirement to exhaust local remedies shall not be applicable “if the 
investor can demonstrate that there are no available domestic legal remedies 
capable of reasonably providing any relief in respect of the same measure”.24 
The requirement to exhaust local remedies has the advantage of reducing the 
scope of an ISDS claim being brought against India. Nonetheless, timely and 
effective settlement of disputes is one of the major concerns for foreign in-
vestors in India. The rationale for the rather long five-years period might be 
that the Indian judiciary is heavily backlogged and operates slowly, so that a 
five-year period was considered as “reasonable in the Indian context”.25  Even 
if so, the requirement that a foreign investor must first exhaust local remedies 
for a period of five years seems excessive and unfair to foreign investors. The 
example of recent BIT with Brazil which omits the ISDS provision from the 
Indian Model BIT and contains more simple provisions on dispute prevention 
procedure (article 18) and arbitration (article 19) indicate that India may have 
to give up its ISDS mechanism, particularly in BITs with large countries.26
The adoption of the Model BIT with the ISDS mechanism shows that In-
dia has rejected the extreme option exercised by countries like South Africa to 
walk out of the system. India wants to be a part of the system but with different 
terms of engagement. Consequently, India has changed the scope and content 
of certain key provisions in the Model BIT to limit challenges to its actions.
IV. INDONESIA
A. BACKGROUND OF BACKLASH
Indonesia has a rather long BIT history. BITs concluded in the early years 
of Indonesia’s development27, were aiming to attract foreign investors grant-
22 Article 15.2
23  Article 15.1.
24  Article 15.4.
25  Grant Hanessian and Kabir Duggal, “The Final 2015 Indian Model BIT: Is This the Change the World 
Wishes to See?” ICSID Review 32, no. 1 (2017), 222.
26  India – Brazil BIT was signed on January 25, 2020, See  UNCTAD, Investment Policy Hub, accessed on 
June 9, 2020, https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/international-investment-agreements/treaty-files/5912/
download.
27 Indonesian first BIT was signed in 1968 with Denmark See: UNCTAD “Investment Policy Hub,” ac-
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ing them a broad protection and rights while limiting the government’s policy 
power.28 Indonesia has concluded so far 72 BITs.29  
Problems deriving from BITs have gradually changed the stance of Indo-
nesia. Indonesia has been involved in a number of ISDS cases with a num-
ber of different foreign investors, including the Churchill Mining and Planet 
Mining,30 Newmont,31 and the latest one is the Indian Metal and Ferro Al-
loys.32. As consequence there was a raising frustration fueled by the view that 
Indonesia was considered as “a place to play, not a player”.33
In reaction to such unfavourable awards, Indonesia has terminated its 30 
BITs and now is in the stage of reviewing its remaining BITs with the view to 
improve the balance between the investor protection and the national interests 
of Indonesia. With the previous experience of being exposed in international 
arbitration tribunals, the Indonesian government tries to achieve its economic 
development goals, but with some modification in its BITs.  
During the review of its BITs process, it has been acknowledged that some 
features of the existing BITs potentially expose to serious risks the Indonesian 
national interests. In order to achieve the objective of reviewing its BIT, the 
Indonesian government has attempted to identify such provisions in its BITs 
in order to come up with the new model of BITs that will secure the national 
interests of Indonesia and still attract the foreign investments. 
B. CONTENTS OF THE INDONESIAN BITS
After the reviewing process, the Indonesian government decided to con-
tinue the renegotiation of its BITs.  The most recent agreement concluded 
by the Indonesian government is the Indonesia-Australia Comprehensive 
Economic Partnership Agreement (IA-CEPA) which was signed on 9 March 
cessed on June 9, 2020, https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/international-investment-agreements/coun-
tries/97/indonesia, 
28 Jan Knörich and Axel Berger, “Friends or Foes? Interactions between Indonesia’s International Invest-
ment Agreements and National Investment Law,” German Development Institutes Studies (2014), 3-6.
29 UNCTAD, “Investment Policy Hub: Indonesia,” UNCTAD, acessed June 10, 2020, https://investmentpo-
licy.unctad.org/international-investment-agreements/countries/97/indonesia.
30 Churchill Mining PLC and Planet Mining Pty Ltd v. Republic Indonesia, ICSID Case No. ARB/12/14 and 
12/40 award on 29 November 2016.
31  Nusa Tenggara Partnership B.V. and PT Newmont Nusa Tenggara v. Republic of Indonesia, ICSID Case 
No. ARB/14/15.
32 Ayomi Amindoni, “The Indian Mining Co. Sues Indonesia for $581 Million,” The Jakarta Post, Novem-
ber 18, 2015, accessed 23 October 2016, http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2015/11/18/indian-mining-
co-sues-indonesia-581-million.html.
33  RSIS, “Indonesia’s Bilateral Investment Treaties: Modernizing for the 21 Century,” RSIS, accessed June 
10, 2020, https://www.rsis.edu.sg/rsis-publication/rsis/indonesias-bilateral-investment-treaties-modernis-
ing-for-the-21st-century/.
Revising BITs as a New Tendency
263
2019. This agreement also includes the Investment Chapter.34
In the investment chapter of IA-CEPA, Indonesia and Australia try to bal-
ance the protection granted to investors and their investments with safeguards 
to preserve the right of the government to regulate in the public interest.  The 
purpose of having the investment chapter in the IA-CEPA is to protect the in-
vestment of both countries and at the same time to maintain the policy power 
of the two governments and the right to regulate for public interest.  
Being the most recent concluded investment agreement, the IA-CEPA can 
be used as illustration to analyze the new Indonesian approach to BITs. The 
focus here will be on several provisions of the IA-CEPA related to definition 
of investors, standards of treatment, as well as the ISDS mechanism. 
C. DEFINITION OF INVESTMENT
In the past, the Indonesian government had been exposed to the claims 
by investors of a third party that used the treaty shopping mechanism by es-
tablishing a mailbox company.35  To avoid such risk, the IA-CEPA has made 
a clear distinction between an investor of a Party and investor of a non-Party, 
as follows: 
“investor of a Party means a Party, or a natural person of a Party or an 
enterprise of a Party, that seeks to make, is making, or has made an invest-
ment in the territory of the other Party; and
investor of a non-Party means, with respect to a Party, an investor that 
seeks to make, is making, or has made an investment in the territory of that 
Party, that is not an investor of the other Party.”36
The above definition indicates that an investor of a Party is the one who 
has a real economic activity and excludes any investor from third parties from 
right to gain protection under the IA-CEPA.
As an effort to improve the safety net for the Indonesian government, the 
Investment Chapter in the IA-CEPA has provision on denial of benefits as 
stipulated in Article 14.13.37  Under the denial of benefits provision, the Indo-
34 Chapter 14: Investment, https://dfat.gov.au/trade/agreements/not-yet-in-force/iacepa/iacepa-text/Pages/
iacepa-chapter-14-investment.aspx (last assessed on June 10, 2020).
35 Nusa Tenggara Partnership B.V. and PT Newmont Nusa Tenggara v. Republic of Indonesia case illus-
trates the risks posed by BITs and potential abuses by foreign investors. Nusa Tenggara Partnership B.V. 
had seat in Amsterdam with zero employees, a typical case of “mailbox company” and it appeared as claim-
ant against Indonesia on the basis of the Netherlands – Indonesia BIT: Nusa Tenggara Partnership B.V. and 
PT Newmont Nusa Tenggara v. Republic of Indonesia, ICSID Case No. ARB/14/15.
36 Article 14.1: Investment, ibid.
37 Article 14.13: Denial of Benefits
A Party may deny the benefits of this Chapter:
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nesian government will enjoy the protection against any investor of the non-
Party who tries to get protection from the Agreement.  To achieve that goal, 
the Indonesian and Australian governments have already defined the kind of 
investor that can enjoy protection of investment, inter alia the investor who 
has substantial business activities in the territory of the Parties.
D. STANDARDS OF TREATMENT
The IA-CEPA contains the provision of National Treatment (Article 14.4), 
Most-Favoured Nation Treatment (Article 14.5) and Minimum Standard of 
Treatment (Article 14.7).
The Article 14.4 on National Treatment states as follows: 
“1. Each Party shall accord to investors of the other Party treatment no 
less favourable than it accords, in like circumstances,9 to its own inves-
tors with respect to the establishment, acquisition, expansion, manage-
ment, conduct, operation and sale or other disposition of investments in 
its territory. 
Each Party shall accord to covered investments treatment no less favour-
able than it accords, in like circumstances, to investments in its territory 
of its own investors with respect to the establishment, acquisition, expan-
sion, management, conduct, operation and sale or other disposition of 
investments.
For greater certainty, the treatment to be accorded by a Party under para-
graphs 1 and 2 means, with respect to a regional level of government, 
treatment no less favourable than the most favourable treatment accorded 
in like circumstances, by that regional level of government to investors, 
and to investments of investors, of the Party of which it forms a part.”
The objective of this Article is to assure that foreign investor will be given 
a treatment which the host country gives to its own investors.  Article 14.7 
a. to an investor of the other Party that is an enterprise of the other Party and to investments of that 
investor if:
i. persons of a non-Party or the denying Party own or control the enterprise; and 
ii. the enterprise has no substantial business activities in the territory of the other Party;
b. to an investor of the other Party that is an enterprise of the other Party  and to investments of that 
investor if:
i. persons of a non-Party own or control the enterprise; and 
ii. the denying Party adopts or maintains measures with respect to the non-Party or a person 
of the non-Party that prohibit transactions with the enterprise or that would be violated or 
circumvented if the benefits of this Chapter were accorded to the enterprise or to its invest-
ments; or
c. to an investor of the other Party if a person of a non-Party owns or controls the enterprise and the 
denying Party does not maintain diplomatic relations with that non-Party.
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specifies that the provision applies when the “like circumstances” exist.  The 
“like circumstances” provision will set a parameter whether the foreign in-
vestor is in a comparable setting with the domestic investor, and whether the 
treatment accorded to the foreign investor is not less favourable than the treat-
ment accorded to a domestic investor.
In Article 14.5, the provision on MFN states the following:
“1. Each Party shall accord to investors of the other Party treatment no 
less favourable than it accords, in like circumstances, to investors and 
their investments of any non-Party with respect to the establishment, ac-
quisition, expansion, management, conduct, operation and sale or other 
disposition of investments in its territory.
Each Party shall accord to covered investments treatment no less favour-
able than it accords, in like circumstances, to investments in its territory of 
investors of any non-Party with respect to the establishment, acquisition, 
expansion, management, conduct, operation and sale or other disposition 
of investments.
2. For greater certainty, the treatment referred to in this Article shall not 
encompass international dispute resolution procedures or mechanisms, 
such as those included in Section B (Investor-State Dispute Settlement).”
The MFN provision remains the standard norm of the investment treaty 
that Indonesia previously had.  The above provision obliges the host state to 
treat foreign investor in a way that is no less favorable than another investor 
from a third country.  The MFN provision allows investor to import another 
Indonesia’s investment treaty to obtain a more generous protection.  However, 
the IA-CEPA also provides that the MFN clause shall not cover the procedures 
or mechanism of the dispute resolution.  Nevertheless, in the IA-CEPA, there 
are numerous safeguard provisions that can be used to minimize the risk of 
being exposed to claims under the ISDS mechanism.
The Minimum Standard Treatment in Article 14.7 states that:
“1. Each Party shall accord to covered investments fair and equitable 
treatment and full protection and security.
For greater certainty:
“fair and equitable treatment” requires each Party to not deny justice in 
any legal or administrative proceedings; 
«full protection and security» requires each Party to take such measures 
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as may be reasonably necessary to ensure the protection and security of 
the covered investment; and
the concepts of «fair and equitable treatment» and «full protection and 
security» do not require treatment in addition to or beyond that which 
is required under the customary international law minimum standard of 
treatment,14 and do not create additional substantive rights.
3. A determination that there has been a breach of another provision of 
this Agreement, or of a separate international agreement, does not estab-
lish that there has been a breach of this Article.
4. For greater certainty, the mere fact that a Party takes or fails to take an 
action that may be inconsistent with an investor›s expectations does not 
constitute a breach of this Article, even if there is loss or damage to the 
covered investment as a result.”
The term of “fair and equitable treatment” has expressed the denial of 
justice as an assurance to protect the foreign investor that the principle of due 
process and transparency will be upheld.  The provision in paragraph (4) pro-
tects the government’s right to regulate, although this may not be in line with 
the investor’s legitimate expectations. The aim of this provision is to limit the 
discretionary power of arbitration tribunal to use a broad interpretation of FET 
standard. 
E. ISDS MECHANISM
One of the Indonesia’s biggest concerns is the Investor-State Dispute Set-
tlement (ISDS) clause.  Such a clause has become a standard provision in 
many BITs, yet it puts a high pressure on the host states to comply with the 
commitments.  According to the ISDS clause, foreign investors may sue the 
host states in the arbitration forum in case of non-compliance with the provi-
sions of the BITs by treating a breach of contract between the host state and 
investor as a breach of BIT. The government of Indonesia is of the view that 
the ISDS in the previous BITS was not fair, in particular because it limited the 
policy power of Indonesia in term of the right to regulate issues that are of its 
national interests, such as protection of the health and environment. 
IA-CEPA does not remove the ISDS clause. Instead, the IA-CEPA clarifies 
the protection that the States are willing to grant to investors, procedural rules 
and still maintain the policy space of the governments.  
An ISDS claim based on IA-CEPA may only be brought in relation to com-
mitments under the Investment Chapter.  ISDS cannot be used to enforce other 
provisions of the agreement.  At the same time, the IA-CEPA preserves each 
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government’s right to adopt regulatory measure in the public interest; this 
means, for example, that public health related government measures cannot 
be challenged under ISDS.
Concerning the scope of the ISDS, under  Article 14.20 the parties agree 
that the ISDS mechanism only applies to disputes between a party and an 
investor of another party to the covered investment and shall not apply to 
investment disputes occurred before the entry into force of IA-CEPA38  This 
approach has helped the Indonesian government to set the timeline for the 
ISDS mechanism which only applies to the investment dispute after the entry 
into force of the IA-CEPA.
Indonesia’s experience with ISDS process had led to drafting the clause 
that provides for consultation and conciliation as stipulated in Article 14.2239 
and 14.23.40  By having a provision that allows the disputing party to initiate 
a consultation and conciliation, the Indonesian government will have the op-
portunity to develop a layer of dispute settlement in amicable way and not 
allowing the dispute to proceed to the arbitration forum directly.
Based on the consultations and conciliation provisions, a party must sub-
mit a written request for a consultation to settle the dispute.  If the parties 
38 Article 14.20
1. This Section shall apply to disputes between a Party and an investor of another Party concerning 
an alleged breach of an obligation of the former under Section A which causes loss or damage to 
the covered investment of the investor (“investment dispute”). 
2. This Section shall not apply to investment disputes which have occurred prior to the date of entry 
into force of this Agreement.
3. A natural person possessing the nationality or citizenship of a Party may not pursue a claim 
against that Party under this Section.
39  Article 14.22: Consultations 
1. In the event of an investment dispute referred to in Article 14.20, the disputing parties shall as far 
as possible resolve the dispute through consultation, with a view towards reaching an amicable 
settlement.  Such consultations shall be initiated by a written request for consultations delivered 
by the disputing investor to the disputing Party. 
2. With the objective of resolving an investment dispute through consultations, a disputing investor 
shall provide the disputing Party, prior to the commencement of consultations, with information 
regarding the legal and factual basis for the investment dispute. 
3. For greater certainty, the initiation of consultations shall not be construed as recognition of the 
jurisdiction of the tribunal.
40  Article 14.23: Conciliation
1. If the dispute cannot be resolved within 180 days from the date of receipt by the disputing Party 
of the written request for consultations, the disputing Party may initiate a conciliation process, 
which shall be mandatory for the disputing investor, with a view towards reaching an amicable 
settlement.  Such a conciliation process shall be initiated by a written request delivered by the 
disputing Party to the disputing investor.
2. The conciliation process under this Article can only be initiated by a written request delivered by 
the disputing Party within 180 days from the date of receipt by the disputing Party of the written 
request for consultations.
3. Expenses incurred in relation to the conciliation process shall be borne equally by the disputing 
parties.  Each disputing party shall bear its own legal expenses.
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cannot resolve the dispute within 180 days, the respondent State may submit 
the claim to conciliation.  Either party may submit a request for a conciliation 
with a goal to achieve an amicable settlement.  The main point is that the pro-
cess to resort to an arbitration tribunal can only be done after going through 
the consultation and conciliation process.
The intention of the Indonesia’s government to balance the right to regu-
late of the government and the right of investor is stipulated in the conclusion 
of an alternative course in the ISDS provision.  The consultation and concilia-
tion mechanisms have become an innovative layer of protection for both gov-
ernment and investor.  Both sides may seek for amicable dispute settlement 
within a certain period of time before proceeding to the arbitration proceed-
ing.  During this stage, both sides are expected to come up with a settlement. 
The Indonesia’s position to have the alternative course in dispute settle-
ment can be seen as a response to the criticism that Indonesia does not have a 
“investor friendly environment”.  Instead, Indonesia is trying to maintain its 
policy space without weakening the protection for investor.  That being said, 
the IA-CEPA represents also a compromise between Indonesia and Australia, 
particularly that both governments have shared a common concern concerning 
the ISDS mechanism.
The attention given to the ISDS mechanism reflects the importance given 
by Indonesia to this part of BITs. Regardless of whether the speculations are 
right or not, the reaction of Indonesia has demonstrated that the ISDS clause 
has indeed become the greatest concern of Indonesian government.   These 
provisions allow Indonesia to avoid that a dispute goes directly to arbitration 
by providing new levels of dispute settlement mechanism. It remains to be 
seen the reaction of foreign investors to these new dispute settlement proce-
dures. 
V. CONCLUSION 
India and Indonesia have taken bold measures to improve their positions 
with regard to BITs. The motives and objectives are similar. Process of revi-
sion in both countries was directly affected by negative experiences with the 
investment arbitration claims. Both countries have taken action to change the 
balance in their favour and acquire a stronger regulatory power. With regard 
the way of revising their BITs, there are some differences but also similarities 
in the approaches of these two countries.
India’s decision to adopt a new Model BIT, especially in light of the grow-
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ing debate on how to reconcile investment protection with host state’s right 
to regulate should be welcomed from the position of the Indian national in-
terests. The examples shown in this paper demonstrate a substantial change 
of balance in favour of host states. The real challenge is how far India will 
stick to its new Model BIT and be successful in negotiating BITs with other 
countries based on this Model BIT.  The case of Brazil-Indonesia BIT signed 
in 2020 raises some doubts about the effectiveness of the Indian BIT Model, 
at least with regard to the ISDS clause. This clause might be too “ambitious” 
to protect the national interests of India which may impair its effectiveness in 
practice. 
Indonesia has taken a different approach from India by not adopting its 
own BIT Model. Instead, the action has been taken to revise the terms in the 
new BITs. The contents of these BITs have some similarity, but also differ-
ences when compared with the Indian BIT Model. For example, Indonesia has 
decided to retain the MFN standard, but the experience of India should serve 
as a warning of potential risks deriving from this standard. 
When it comes to termination of BITs, as a matter of principle, revision 
might be better option than termination. It is better to revise an unfavourable 
BIT and rectify its adverse effects, instead of simply terminating. The host 
states should be aware of the “sunset clause” that enables BITs to continue 
impacting the parties even after their termination (some BITs provide for 20 
years of survival period).41
One important issue that will be observed is the impact these revisions 
of BITs in India and Indonesia will have on foreign investment to these two 
countries. Main goal of BITs is to protect foreign investment rather than pro-
mote it. It can be argued that foreign investment is promoted through its pro-
tection, but there is no hard evidence that would link these two in practice.42 
The profit is normally the most important incentive of investors. India and In-
donesia are among the top four most populous countries in the world offering 
great potential to investors. Investors may come to these two countries even 
without any BITs.43 However, the importance of BITs should not be underesti-
41  For example, Art. 15(2) of the Netherlands – Indonesia BIT provides for “sunset” clause of 15 years. This 
means that all investments made until 2015 will be protected until 2030.
42  M. Sornarajah, “Review of Asian views on foreign investment law,” in Foreign Investment and Dispute 
Resolution Law and Practice in Asia, Vivienne Bath and Luke Nottage, eds. (Routledge, 2011) 252.
43 According to the Citizen Global Watch report from 2018 (covering both India and Indonesia), “invest-
ment flows from former BIT partner countries were more likely to increase rather than decrease after BIT 
termination”. Available at Public Citizen, “Termination of Bilateral Investment Treaties Has Not Negative-
ly Affected Countries’ Foreign Direct Investment Inflows,”  Public Citizen, April 16, 2018, accessed June 
9, 2020, https://www.citizen.org/article/termination-of-bilateral-investment-treaties-has-not-negatively-
affected-countries-foreign-direct-investment-inflows/.For opposite opinion, see, Gerard P.H. Kreijen, ‘The 
Termination of Bilateral Investment Protection Challenges for Investors’ (Jakarta, 2014).
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mated; there is no doubt that investors prefer to invest in countries where their 
interests are well protected by BITs. The key issue is that protection of foreign 
investors should not be at expense of the national interests of the host state; 
or, more precisely, the issue is how to find a fair balance between these two 
potentially conflicting interests.44 
India and Indonesia are two important countries, and their actions regard-
ing revision of BITs are carefully observed. Of course, each country has its 
priorities and interests, but learning from other countries experience provides 
a useful guidance. Experiences can be good and bad, and both carry weight. 
What is the message sent by India and Indonesia to other developing coun-
tries? Should developing countries dispense all BITs? These two countries 
have made bold decisions and many countries may be reluctant to take similar 
actions. Nevertheless, India and Indonesia have sent an important message. 
Maybe the time has come to consider alternatives to BITs and their eventual 
replacement with investor-State negotiated contracts, an idea developed by 
Sornarajah.45 The fact is that BITs are imposing obligations only on the host 
country’s obligations, with no similar obligations imposed on foreign inves-
tors; they are just beneficiaries of BITs even without taking part in their ne-
gotiations. That system does not seem to be fair. On the other hand, foreign 
investors are exposed to a number of different risks in foreign jurisdictions 
and they do need a protection. 
Anyway, BITs are likely to be used in future, and developing countries 
have various reasons to limit their exposure to BIT claims; they should be cau-
tious when negotiating BITs in order to limit BIT protection to those investors 
who are meant to be protected, and not more than is fair for both parties. The 
examples of India and Indonesia represent illustration of the the emergence of 
a new generation of BITs, which is aimed at contributing to a balanced treat-
ment of foreign investment and reducing risks for the host states. The time 
will show whether this new approach will actually enable the host states to 
achieve the intended objective of  maximizing the benefits of foreign invest-
ment. 
44 Abdulkadir Jailani, “Indonesia’s Perspective on Review of International Investment Agreement,” in Re-
thinking Bilateral Investment Treaties Critical Issue and Policy Choices, Kavaljit Singh and Burghard Ilge, 
eds., (Amsterdam and New Delhi: Both Ends, Madhyam, Somo, 2016) 114.
45 M. Sornarajah, “Review of Asian views on foreign investment law” in Vivienne Bath and Luke Nottage 
(eds.), Foreign Investment and Dispute Resolution Law and Practice in Asia (Routledge, 2011) 252. There 
is certainly some weight in the argument of Professor Sornarajah that investment treaties “promote preda-
tory lawyers and arbitrators” rather than economic development of the host states.
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